This was an unexpected honor:

Kevin W. Wimberly has been named to the Florida Rising Stars list as one of the top up-and-coming attorneys in Florida for 2012.  Each year, no more than 2.5 percent of the lawyers in the state receive this honor.  The selection for this respected list is made by the research team at Super Lawyers.

Super Lawyers, a Thomson Reuters business, is a rating service of outstanding lawyers from more than 70 practice areas who have attained a high degree of peer recognition and professional achievement.  The annual selections are made using a rigorous multi-phased process that includes a statewide survey of lawyers, and independent research evaluation of candidates, and peer reviews by practice area.

The Rising Stars lists are published nationwide in Super Lawyers magazine and in leading city and regional magazines across the country.

“Immoral, deceptive, or scandalous” trademarks are not eligible for registration with the United States Patent and Trademark Office.  See 15 U.S.C. 1052 (Section 2(a) of the Lanham Act).  Similarly, Florida law bars registration of “immoral, deceptive, or scandalous” marks.  See Fla. Stat. 495.021(a).  Such refusals are not that uncommon.  In fact, a colleague and former professor of mine, Marc Randazza, has blogged extensively on the subject.

A recent story on WPTV.com out of West Palm Beach brought to my attention a state-based trademark application that was rejected as being immoral.  I’m pretty sure this is the first state trademark application that I’ve seen rejected on such grounds.  (The state registration system is not nearly as robust as the USPTO’s online system, so it’s difficult to find out how many state applications are refused and under what grounds.)

The applicant operates a restaurant named “fuku,” which, according to the owner, means “good fortune, wealth and prosperity.”  (Doesn’t it seem like every Japanese word means good fortune/luck/prosperity?)  Apparently the examiner reviewing the application didn’t like the “fuck you” sound and rejected the application. (Again, the state system is crude, so I’m unable to read the actual refusal letter.)

At the federal level, the USPTO has an inconsistent history with “fuku” marks.  FUKU-BONSAI was allowed registration.  FUKU for clothes probably would have been registered if the applicant had responded to an Office Action.  However, FUKU for condoms and retail stores selling adult toys seems to be having some trouble.

According to the news reports, the owner of fuku restaurant plans to appeal the refusal.  (Another strategy might be file an application with the USPTO.  Federal registration requires interstate commercial use.  Depending on the restaurant’s location and marketing [i.e. if it is near a major interstate highway or tourist spot], it may be possible to allege interstate commerce.  But, I’m guessing that fuku’s attorney will be able to overcome the state refusal based on the Japanese meaning.)

Additional coverage:  HuffPo

Every election cycle some band gets mad that a politician with unwelcome views has used the band’s song during campaign events.  I even blogged about one such instance HERE.

Today’s story is even better.  The Republican Party of Florida (“RPOF”) apparently wanted a favorable front-page headline to promote Governor Scott.  RPOF either couldn’t find one or just thought making one up was easier:

The advertisement:

 

The problem is that, according to the Miami Herald, it never ran a “New Law Helps Put Floridians Back to Work” story.  In fact, RPOF’s ad agency replaced the true headline (“Murders highlight rise in crime in Guatemala”) and the lead photo from the March 5, 2007 edition of the newspaper.  While political speech is nothing less than sacred under the First Amendment, this is pure deception.

 

At the end of my post regarding the trademark registration applications that Trayvon’s mother filed, I stated that I had “not seen any statements regarding the intent behind these trademark applications.”

Today, I found a report from Radar Online that the intent behind the applications was in fact to prevent others from profiting.  The quote, attributed to the family’s attorney, states: “Trayvon’s parents will never seek to financially profit from these trademarks, period. I can’t emphasize that point enough.”  Source.

I also checked the status of the applications today, and a preliminary amendment was filed in both applications to correct the misspelling of Trayvon’s mother’s name.

Central Florida has been in the national news for more than Mickey Mouse and Dwight Howard recently.  The Casey Anthony trial riveted the nation and brought scores of news crews to Orlando.  From Nancy Grace to Geraldo Rivera, there was no escaping the “tot mom” and her “Bella Vita” tattoo.  Tragically, Central Florida was in the news for all the wrong reasons.

That trend continues.  As with the homicide of Caylee Anthony, the death of a child has once again brought national attention to Central Florida.  Trayvon Martin was shot dead while walking to his house after buying some ice tea and Skittles candy at the nearby convenience store.  The killer, George Zimmerman has claimed self-defense.  Zimmerman is (or was) involved in the Neighborhood Watch program, and he is reported to have a history of calling 911 to report “suspicious” incidents. One reason that this case has brought so much attention is because the local police did not arrest Zimmerman after the shooting.  The police indicated that they had no probable cause to dispute Zimmerman’s statements that he shot Trayvon in self-defense.

But this post is not about the guilt or innocence of either of these accused murderers.  One had her day in court, and the other should get the same “opportunity.”

This post is about the families of the deceased filing trademark applications.  It’s a sad thought.  Rather than Caylee Anthony or Trayvon Martin becoming business owners themselves, needy for trademark protection, their families have filed trademark applications after their deaths.

For Caylee, the trademark applications were filed by her grandparents’ attorney.  In fact, the applications claim that the trademarks are owned by the attorney.  The applications are for “CAYLEE ANTHONY” and “JUSTICE FOR CAYLEE.”  The goods that are listed in the applications include t-shirts, underwear, and buttons.  The applications were filed as “intent-to-use” applications, which means that the applicant had to declare that he intended to use the trademarks in a bona fide offering of the goods.

When news of this got out, many people accused the Anthonys of “cashing in” on the death of Caylee.  While this was most likely a knee-jerk reaction – surely the Anthonys wouldn’t be trying to profit from the death of their granddaughter – there is some legal merit to the charge of cashing in.  This is because trademark law is a creature of the Commerce Clause in the United States Constitution.  The Commerce Clause enables Congress to regulate interstate commerce.  As such, federal trademark registration is only available to those who seek to use a trademark for interstate commercial purposes.

However, as explained in the previous link, the Anthonys filed these trademark applications in order to prevent others from cashing in.  In that respect, they were “defensive” trademark applications.  The fact that a federal trademark applicant must declare that they either are using or intend to use the mark in interstate commerce makes this practice of “defensive” trademark applications a very interesting topic, but it is beyond the scope of this post.

This post is focused on the fact that the Caylee Anthony trademark applications, and the ones described below, both involve personal names.  I have blogged about this issue before.  In order to register a personal name as a trademark, the applicant must disclose whether or not the trademark refers to a living individual.  If so, the applicant must state whether or not the individual has provided consent to use his or her name in the application.

The Trademark Manual of Examining Procedure (“TMEP”) explains:

If a mark comprises the name or likeness of a living individual and consent to register is of record, a statement to that effect must be printed in the Official Gazette and on the registration certificate.

http://tess2.uspto.gov/tmdb/tmep/0800.htm#_T81301a

Similarly, if the trademark is a name but does not depict a living individual, a statement to that effect must be made:

If a name or likeness that could reasonably be perceived as that of a living individual is not that of a specific living individual, a statement to that effect must be printed in the Official Gazette and on the registration certificate. The statement should read as follows:

“__________ does not identify a living individual.”

The applicant should explain any additional relevant circumstances. For example, if the matter identifies a certain character in literature or a deceased historical person, then a statement of these facts in the record may be helpful, but this information will not be printed in the Official Gazette or on the registration certificate.

http://tess2.uspto.gov/tmdb/tmep/0800.htm#_T81301b

Unfortunately, the attorney who filed the Caylee Anthony applications did not make the appropriate statements concerning the life or death of the person referenced in the applications, Caylee Anthony.  The Examining Attorney from the USPTO therefore issued an “Office Action” which required that the applicant fix the error:

 The applied-for mark includes a name that may identify a particular famous or historical individual who is deceased.  Specifically, the mark includes the name “CAYLEE.”  Where a name, portrait or signature in a mark identifies a particular living individual, the mark can be registered only with the written consent of that individual.  Trademark Act Section 2(c), 15 U.S.C. §1052(c); TMEP §813; see TMEP §§1206 et seq.  In this situation, where it is unclear whether the name, portrait or signature is that of a living individual, applicant must so clarify for the record.  See TMEP §§813.01(b), 1206.03, 1206.05.

Accordingly, if the individual identified in the mark is in fact deceased, applicant should provide the following statement: 

The name, portrait, or signature shown in the mark does not identify a living individual.

See TMEP §§813.01(b), 1206.03, 1206.05.

If the name or signature in the mark does identify a particular living individual, then applicant must submit the following:

(1)  A statement that the name “CAYLEE” identifies a living individual whose consent is of record.  If the name represents that of a pseudonym, stage name, or nickname, applicant must include a statement that {specify fictitious or assumed name} identifies the {indicate pseudonym/stage name/nickname} of {specify actual name}, a living individual whose consent is of record; and

(2)  A written consent, personally signed by the individual whose name or signature appears in the mark, authorizing applicant to register the name, pseudonym, stage name, nickname, or signature as a trademark and/or service mark with the USPTO (e.g., “I consent to the use and registration by Lippman Law Offices, P.A. of my name “CAYLEE” as a trademark and/or service mark with the USPTO”).

TMEP §§813, 813.01(a), 1206.04(a); see 37 C.F.R. §2.61(b).

See Office Action, HERE.  That was no doubt a sad piece of mail for the Anthonys’ attorney to open.  These applications were filed well after Caylee’s remains were found, and it’s unfortunate that the appropriate statements concerning the life or death of the person depicted in the trademarks weren’t made in the application.  Interestingly, the 6-month period in which to file a reply to the Office Action has passed, so the Examining Attorney should be marking the applications as “abandoned” in the near future.  It is not a stretch to think that these applications were simply filed to give the Anthonys’ attorney a federal application number to use in cease and desist letters which were no doubt sent to the people who truly were seeking to cash in on the Casey Anthony trial.  With the heated emotions dying down, and opportunists turning to a fresher news cycle, there may simply be no need for the CAYLEE ANTHONY and JUSTICE FOR CAYLEE trademarks anymore.

Image originally found on MSNBC.com. Used for educational and commentary purposes.

This brings us to today’s news about Trayvon Martin.  His mother, Sybrina Fulton, has filed two trademark applications using her son’s name.  The applications are for JUSTICE FOR TRAYVON and I AM TRAYVON.  As with the Caylee Anthony applications, these applications are intent-to-use applications, and the goods include DVDs, CDs, and other media. (This is also beyond the scope of this article, but as shown in the above picture and on the local news story I just saw, which included interviewing a man selling “Justice for Trayvon” t-shirts, there may actually be people that have already made a commercial use of the JUSTICE FOR TRAYVON and I AM TRAYVON trademarks.  If so, those people might have a superior common law claim to the trademark rights than Trayvon’s mother.)

Sadly, the attorney that filed the Trayvon Martin applications also failed to indicate whether or not “Trayvon” is a living or deceased individual.  (It also appears that Sybrina’s name was misspelled in the applications.)  The fact that such “living or dead” statement was not made means that 3 or 4 months from now, Trayvon’s mother’s attorney will be getting that same piece of mail requesting further information about the status of Trayvon Martin’s life.

As with the Caylee Anthony trademark applications, there has been a public backlash against this alleged attempt to “cash in.”  Comments in stories such as THIS one (“Nothing like cashing in. I bet Al Sharpton helped her fill out the paperwork”) and THIS one (“grieving all the way to the bank”), made by the oft-ignorant people hiding behind Internet screen-names, show a) a lack of class, and b) a lack of understanding that these applications may be “defensive” and designed to prevent others from doing the very thing that Trayvon’s mom is being accused of – cashing in on the death of her son.

While I have not seen any statements regarding the intent behind these trademark applications, it would not be the first time that the family member of a murder victim has filed trademark applications to stop others from profiting from the tragedy.  And, frankly, even Trayvon’s mother does want to offer DVDs and CDs under the JUSTICE FOR TRAYVON and I AM TRAYVON trademarks, why does that erase any sympathy and support for a mother grieving the murder of her son?

I’ll keep an eye on these applications and post a follow up when there’s something to report.

Trade dress cases are fun.  Trade dress typically refers to the visual appearance of something – such as a product’s packaging or the design of the product.  The shape of a Coca-Cola bottle is an example of trade dress.  When you see that distinctive bottle shape, you immediately think of the source, Coca-Cola.

One of the more popular trade dress cases (at least in Florida) was the “Hooters v. Winghouse” case.  There, Hooters’ parent company sued the company behind the Winghouse chain of restaurants.  Hooters claimed that its trade dress was “the Hooters Girl uniform; rough-hewn rustic interior woodwork, including light colored wooden walls and floors; dining tables consisting of red wood of varying hues, surrounded by lighter pine wood, and covered with a shiny epoxy; a table-top setup consisting of a wooden vertical paper towel
spool, wood-weave plateware, and table tents; a parchment paper menu bearing the story of the restaurant on its reverse side; surfboards; wall-mounted photographs of celebrities taken with servers; pictures of girls in attractive swimwear; road signs displaying clever sayings; hula
hoops; large-bulb Christmas lights; wall-mounted sports memorabilia; bumper stickers; and “beachy” music from the ‘50s through the ‘80s.

However, the court in that case focused on the very first item in that list – the Hooters Girl uniform.  Ultimately, the court found that the Hooters uniform is “functional,” and to deny another business from being able to use waitresses in shorty-shorts and tank tops would be an “impermissible burden on competition.”  Thus, you now have two places to go get wings and see girls in tiny outfits.  You just need to choose if you prefer orange/white uniforms or black/red.

Now that you have an idea about what trade dress is, Florida IP Trends presents:

Yoga Berry Corporation v. Coco Mango, LLC [COMPLAINT]

This case got my attention because of the “Yoga Berry” plaintiff.  My first thought was that famed catcher Yogi Berra must have gotten into the health nut business or something.  But no, there does not seem to be a relationship between Yogi Berra and Yoga Berry (although I cannot confirm or deny it).  That makes this a somewhat unsympathetic plaintiff for me.  Before even reading the complaint I was thinking, “Gee, if these guys are trading on the name of the great Yogi Berra, what beef do they have with Coco Mango?

Well, the beef is in the yogurt.  [author's attempt at a Yogiism]

Yoga Berry is suing the operator of a “Coco Mango” yogurt store.  Yoga Berry alleges that Coco Mango copied the distinctive trade dress found in the YOBE yogurt stores.

Yoga Berry has a tough hill to climb.  Just as Hooters learned that even a distinctive and well-recognized decor can ultimately fail as trade dress, Yoga Berry will have to prove that its trade dress is protectable.  The Complaint could be a little clearer in defining the trade dress, but it looks like a YOBE store has “futuristic white stools, chairs, table, and benches,” and “distinctive light fixtures” among other things.  Pictures or exhibits would have been nice in a complaint like this.  (I’m sure the judge would have appreciated them, too.)  However, since there were none, I took the opportunity to find some.  Having never been in either store, I just couldn’t picture what the Complaint was trying to show.

YOBE Store

Coco Mango Store

Ok, so maybe the local Scan Design or IKEA was having a sale.  You have to admit – the light fixtures and stools look to be identical, if not different colors.  But, is this really protectable trade dress?  When consumers see those light fixtures, stools, and other items that are claimed as trade dress, do those consumers think of the source, Yoga Berry?  Or is this more like the Hooters/Winghouse case where no one business should be able to lock up the “uncomfortable modern chairs and lamps” decoration?

Protectable trade dress or not, this will be the key issue in the case:

Assuming that the allegations in the Complaint are true, the operator of Coco Mango decided not to open a “YOBE” franchise as offered by Yoga Berry.  But, instead of simply opening a different yogurt shop with traditionally-boring yogurt shop fixtures, the Coco Mango operator decided to simply source the same lamps, chairs, and other fixtures that Yoga Berry counts as its own trade dress.  Why pay the franchise fee when you can simply duplicate the look and feel that the franchisor is selling?  And how did Yoga Berry discover this smoking gun information?  A Yoga Berry “representative” went to Coco Mango to ask about it, and the employee disclosed the reason for the chairs, lamps, and other decor.  Oops.

Coco Mango has answered the complaint (in distinctive Arial font, not Times New Roman as Yoga Berry’s complaint) so we should have some more to write about in the future.  My money is on one of the unfair competition counts.  The trade dress and state dilution claims seem like a stretch.  But, it ain’t over til it’s over.

I recently gave a presentation on some of the legal issues concerning developing mobile apps and making them available in the various app marketplaces (iTunes App Store, etc).  I will post a version of the presentation soon.

However, in the couple of months that have passed since I created the presentation, much has changed.

In the presentation, I explained that app developers may choose to provide their own EULA if they don’t want Apple’s default EULA to control the use of the app.  I also showed how that looks in practice – one app had a separate button linking to the developer’s “custom” EULA while the other app did not, thus Apple’s EULA governed that app.

On February 22, 2012, California’s AG signed a “Joint Statement” with various app marketplace providers (i.e. Apple’s App Store, Google’s Android Marketplace) which will require app developers to provide a Privacy Policy with each app that collects personal information.  This agreement is intended to force all app developers to comply with California’s existing Online Privacy Protection Act (Business and Professions Code section 22575) which mandates that websites have a Privacy Policy.  The app marketplace providers will edit their existing app submission protocols to take into account Privacy Policies, and there will be easy access to the app’s Privacy Policy, similar to the custom EULA button addressed above.

From the Press Release:  “This agreement will allow consumers the opportunity to review an app’s privacy policy before they download the app rather than after, and will offer consumers a consistent location for an app’s privacy policy on the application-download screen. If developers do not comply with their stated privacy policies, they can be prosecuted under California’s Unfair Competition Law and/or False Advertising Law.”

See: http://oag.ca.gov/news/press_release?id=2630&y=&m

Another big change was Google’s March 6, 2012 decision to abandon the “Android Marketplace” brand for the “official” Android marketplace.  Google will now offer Android apps at the “Google Play Store.”   As a trademark attorney, I applaud ditching such a descriptive phrase as a brand, but it means I need to re-d0 part of my presentation now!

See: http://techcrunch.com/2012/03/06/goodbye-android-market-hello-google-play/

UPDATE:

Mobile Apps presentation (some slides may be NSFW if your work has such policies).  I wish I had an MP3 to post of the actual commentary that went with the slides.

Blogging from my iPad at the 3rd Annual IP Law Symposium in Orlando.

WordPress.com doesn’t have a liveblogging feature, so please refresh this post often to get the updates.

Lots of familiar faces from my old firm and from colleagues past and present.

Scott Bain of the SIIA gave an interesting overview of the first sale doctrine in copyright. Recent cases have closed a loophole wherein companies would legitimately buy a copyrighted item overseas and then import it into the US for sale at a cheaper price than the manufacturer intended. While the first sale doctrine gives you the right to resell a CD or other copyrighted work that you lawfully purchased in the US, that doctrine will most likely not apply to items imported from abroad.

John Welch of the TTABlog just gave a humorous, somewhat self-deprecating talk regarding trends at the TTAB. He predicts that lack of bona fide intent to use will be the new hot topic – replacing fraud as the trend to watch. I’ve never seen a presenter admit to getting bored by his own presentation. Funny guy. Glad the IP Committee was able to bring him in.

20120302-105352.jpg

20120302-105451.jpg

10:56 update

Strategies for winning patent trials. Not as relevant to my practice as it once was…

Takeaway: test juries show that jurors in patent trials have no flipping clue what attorneys are talking about. They need lots of hand holding and visual aids to explain the technology and patent claims.

11:08…

The session at 11:30 should be good. Third Party Liability in IP. Many of our firm’s clients operate websites that allow user-generated content. These third-party users can sometimes expose the website operator to liability for copyright and trademark infringement depending on the facts and circumstances. We’re well-versed in this area of law, but it’s always good to hear from academics and other colleagues.

12:00…

No Megaupload reference yet… Nice overview of the cases and elements for trademark, patent, and copyright secondary liability.

Here comes the juicy stuff. DMCA safe harbors.

Red flag knowledge of infringement is hard to prove, but it’s a potentially-dangerous concept for defendants.

UMG v. Shelter case from December 2011 – “high water mark for defendants.”

Viacom v. YouTube – red flag must be concerning a specific work, not “general red flags.” (district court)

Speaker suggests that using accomplice liability theories from criminal law is not appropriate for civil secondary infringement tests.

Future developments: more criminal enforcement and criminal laws directed toward infringement. (first megaupload reference).

LUNCH

Excellent presentation by Anne Gilson LaLonde (yes, that Gilson) re. non-traditional trademarks (scent, flavor, color). Very entertaining and informative.

Trademark Updates

Now, Leslie Lott is discussing the color red as a protectable trademark for Louboutin shoes. Apparently they’re a big deal.

Still Leslie. Great overview of the new gTLDs.  The cost to bring a new gTLD to market is huge. Likelihood of return on investment?  Will consumers use .hilton, .lawyer, .restaurant, etc.?

3:05

Battery running low.

Last presentation and this one concerns nerdcore patent stuff.

Battery 10%

Was tethering my iPad through my iPhone. iPhone died. Found an open network for the iPad…  Back in business.

3:45

Ethical Issues When Pursuing Online Infringers

Good stuff. Domaintools.com, arin.net, archive.org. This is the geekdom I enjoy.  Learning that you can combine this type of stuff with lawyering is what prompted me to go to law school.

I’ve focused a lot of my writing in other areas/forums lately, but Florida IP Trends is still breathing, and posts are forthcoming.

I’m also considering expanding the scope of the blog to include some of my other major practice areas, such as mobile apps, gaming, online intermediaries, and First Amendment issues.  To that end, I suppose a misnamed blog is better than a dead one.

I’m breaking the “Florida” part of Florida IP Trends to post a link to this article.  Will the mass-Doe infringement suits be the genesis of this vision of society?

http://www.ftrain.com/nanolaw.html

A sample paragraph:

We had gone to a baseball game at the beginning of the season. They had played a song on the public address system, and she sang along without permission. They used to factor that into ticket price—they still do if you pay extra or have a season pass—but now other companies handled the followup. And here was the video from that day, one of many tens of thousands simultaneously recorded from gun scanners on the stadium roof. In the video my daughter wore a cap and a blue T-shirt. I sat beside her, my arm over her shoulder, grinning. Her voice was clear and high; the ambient roar of the audience beyond us filtered down to static.

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